"双碳"目标下平台企业与供应商联合减排演化博弈研究——考虑公众监督
An Evolutionary Game of Joint Emission Reduction of Platforms and Suppliers under Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality Policy——Considering Public Supervision
徐钰珩1
作者信息
- 1. 南京林业大学 经济管理学院,江苏 南京 210037
- 折叠
摘要
碳交易背景下,互联网平台集合了大量的用户与供应商企业,其能源消耗和碳排放占比快速增长,平台企业在实现社会低碳生产中有着举足轻重的作用.基于供应商企业面临的技术或资金现实难题,考虑供应链联合减排,文中融入了公众监督,构建了政府、平台企业以及供应商的三方演化模型,分析博弈系统稳定性.研究结果表明,平台企业与供应商的联动机制下高碳生产的处罚额达到一定条件,能够更有效地推动低碳生产;当政府或公众监管力度增强时,供应链联合减排效果增加明显;平台企业的绿色支持成本是影响供应商绿色低碳生产和平台企业进行绿色低碳生产意愿的重要因素.
Abstract
Under the background of carbon trading,platforms have gathered a large number of users and supplier enterprises,of which the proportion of energy consumption and carbon emissions is rapidly increasing,and platforms play a crucial role in achieving low-carbon production in society.Based on the technical or financial difficulties faced by supplier enterprises,considering supply chain joint emission reduction,incorporating public supervision,a tripartite evolutionary model of government,platform enterprises,and suppliers was constructed to analyze the stability of the game system.The research results indicate that under the linkage mechanism between platform enterprises and suppliers,the penalties for high-carbon production can reach certain conditions,which can more effectively promote low-carbon production;When the government or public supervision is strengthened,the joint emission reduction increases significantly;The green support cost of platforms is an important factor affecting the green and low-carbon production of suppliers and the willingness of platform enterprises to engage in green and low-carbon production.
关键词
碳交易/供应链/联合减排/公众监督/演化博弈Key words
carbon trading/supply chain/joint emission reduction/public supervision/evolutionary game引用本文复制引用
基金项目
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(20YJC630142)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据