An Evolutionary Game of Joint Emission Reduction of Platforms and Suppliers under Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality Policy——Considering Public Supervision
Under the background of carbon trading,platforms have gathered a large number of users and supplier enterprises,of which the proportion of energy consumption and carbon emissions is rapidly increasing,and platforms play a crucial role in achieving low-carbon production in society.Based on the technical or financial difficulties faced by supplier enterprises,considering supply chain joint emission reduction,incorporating public supervision,a tripartite evolutionary model of government,platform enterprises,and suppliers was constructed to analyze the stability of the game system.The research results indicate that under the linkage mechanism between platform enterprises and suppliers,the penalties for high-carbon production can reach certain conditions,which can more effectively promote low-carbon production;When the government or public supervision is strengthened,the joint emission reduction increases significantly;The green support cost of platforms is an important factor affecting the green and low-carbon production of suppliers and the willingness of platform enterprises to engage in green and low-carbon production.
carbon tradingsupply chainjoint emission reductionpublic supervisionevolutionary game
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