Research on the Coordination of Interests between Express Enterprises and Franchisees under Government Regulation
Franchise as a commonly used business model enables the rapid expansion of express enterprises.This paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of express enterprises,franchisees and government departments,and obtains seven equilibrium points and corresponding stability conditions through stability analysis.Through numerical simulation,the evolution path of the ideal strategy of the three-party evolution ary game is analyzed,and the internal mechanism of the evolution of express enterprises,franchisees and government departments is elucidated.By analyzing the impact of benefit distribution and risk sharing on the evolutionary game of express enterprises and franchisees,the results show that:for express enterprises,the rate of evolution of express enterprises to the regulatory strategy is directly proportional to the proportion of franchisees'revenue,and inversely proportional to the proportion of the risk sharing;for franchisees,the rate of evolution of franchisees'strategy of providing high-quality services is directly proportional to the proportion of franchisees minus that charged by express enterprise regulation,and inversely proportional to the proportion of risk sharing.Finally,the government's behavior on the impact of the three-party evolutionary game is studied,and the results show that the increase in the intensity and amount of incentives,and the high-intensity management of the government department can accelerate the evolution of express enterprises to the regulatory strategy,and meanwhile promote the evolution of franchisees to the strategy of providing high-quality services.
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