Research on Quality Improvement Decision Making of Network Freight Platforms
Based on the two-sided market theory,the quality management and pricing decisions of network freight transport platforms are studied. Platforms usually adopt two quality strategies of subsidising high-quality vehicle owners and regulating low-quality vehicle owners,to improve the overall quality of vehicle owners within the platform. Considering the cross-network externalities between bilateral users and shippers' preference for high-quality owners,this paper uses game theory to construct a pricing and decision-making model for network freight platforms under the two strategies in the monopoly scenario. It is found that the subsidy strategy always benefits the platform. Platform profits only increase when the regulatory cost is below a threshold. When the regulatory cost is very low,the regulatory strategy is the optimal strategy for the platform,and in the rest of the cases,choosing the subsidy strategy is the optimal decision for the platform. The charge for bilateral users is always higher than unregulated when adopting the subsidy strategy,which also leads to an increase in the number of owners and shippers;the charge under the regulatory strategy is determined by the combination of the regulatory cost and the share of high-quality owners in the platform.
万方数据
维普
