首页|高管超额薪酬对企业投资效率的影响研究——基于企业风险承担的中介作用

高管超额薪酬对企业投资效率的影响研究——基于企业风险承担的中介作用

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高管薪酬会对企业投资效率产生一定影响.以2010-2021年沪深A股上市公司财务数据为样本,构建固定效应模型对样本数据进行多元线性回归分析.研究发现:高管超额薪酬对企业投资效率具有负向影响,企业风险承担在高管超额薪酬对企业投资效率产生影响的过程中发挥部分中介效应,且这一现象在非国有企业中更显著.以上结果表明,如果企业高管的薪酬水平超过其预期薪酬水平,则会使企业风险承担水平上升,导致企业投资效率降低.建议企业合理制定高管薪酬体系,实施有效监管,并将企业风险承担水平控制在适当区间内,以此确保企业不会出现非效率投资现象,推动企业持续健康发展.
Research on the Impact of Excessive Executive Compensation on Corporate Investment Efficiency Based on the Mediating Role of Corporate Risk-Taking
Executive compensation can have a certain impact on corporate investment efficiency.Taking the financial data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2010 to 2021 as samples,this paper constructs a fixed-effect model to conduct multiple linear regression analysis on the sample data.It is found that excessive executive compensation has a negative impact on corporate investment efficiency,and corporate risk-taking plays a partial mediating effect in the process of the impact of excessive executive compensation on corporate investment efficiency,and this phenomenon is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises.The above results indicate that if the actual compensation level of corporate executives exceeds their expected compensation level,it will lead to an increase in the level of risk-taking and a decrease in corporate investment efficiency.It is recommended that enterprises establish a reasonable executive compensation system,carry out effective supervision,and control the level of corporate risk-taking within a reasonable range,so as to ensure that enterprises do not experience inefficient investment phenomena and promote sustainable and healthy development of enterprises.

excessive executive compensationcorporate investment efficiencycorporate risk-takingmediating effect

李泽旭、周敏

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上海工程技术大学,上海 201620

宜宾学院,四川宜宾 644000

高管超额薪酬 企业投资效率 企业风险承担 中介效应

2024

无锡商业职业技术学院学报
无锡商业职业技术学院

无锡商业职业技术学院学报

影响因子:0.448
ISSN:1671-4806
年,卷(期):2024.24(1)
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