Executive compensation can have a certain impact on corporate investment efficiency.Taking the financial data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2010 to 2021 as samples,this paper constructs a fixed-effect model to conduct multiple linear regression analysis on the sample data.It is found that excessive executive compensation has a negative impact on corporate investment efficiency,and corporate risk-taking plays a partial mediating effect in the process of the impact of excessive executive compensation on corporate investment efficiency,and this phenomenon is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises.The above results indicate that if the actual compensation level of corporate executives exceeds their expected compensation level,it will lead to an increase in the level of risk-taking and a decrease in corporate investment efficiency.It is recommended that enterprises establish a reasonable executive compensation system,carry out effective supervision,and control the level of corporate risk-taking within a reasonable range,so as to ensure that enterprises do not experience inefficient investment phenomena and promote sustainable and healthy development of enterprises.
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