Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Supply Chain Investment and Emission Reduction under Government Regulation
The problem of environmental pollution and global warming caused by industrialization is becoming increasingly serious.As global concern about environmental issues grows,the government and society are demanding more and more reductions in carbon emissions.To meet international commitments,the government must regulate carbon emissions from companies and take appropriate measures to achieve emission reduction targets.Some companies are involved but are reluctant to reduce their emissions directly.To solve this problem,this paper introduces government regulation and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government,suppliers,and manufacturers,and discusses how to reduce the free riding behaviors of suppliers and manufacturers.The results show that the costs of active government regulation and subsidies to suppliers and manufacturers should be within a reasonable range.If both suppliers and manufacturers invest in emission reduction,the higher the increase in government revenue,carbon tax rate and carbon subsidy rate,the more conducive it is for the system to evolve towards a strategy where the government actively regulates,and suppliers and manufacturers invest in emission reduction.For suppliers and manufacturers,the lower the cost of investing in emission reductions and the lower the benefits of free riding,the better it is for the system to evolve.Therefore,the government should actively regulate and establish appropriate dynamic reward and punishment mechanisms,and suppliers and manufacturers should develop sustainable development strategies,improve energy efficiency,and promote low-carbon technologies and equipment.
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