Green Trading Strategy Behavior Evolution of Enterprise under Background of Government Incentives
Under the background of carbon peak and carbon neutrality,China actively promotes green power trading,but the current green power market still faces problems such as the weak willingness of enterprises to participate in the market and small trading volume.To address the above problems,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model for both power purchasing enterprises and new energy power generation enterprises,analyzes the stability of strategies under the interaction of game subjects,and explores the evolutionary path of the model and the strategy selection with three factors of consumption ratio,compliance rate,and policy incentives.The results show that the strategy for the power purchasing enterprises will eventually evolve towards purchasing green power,and the strategy for the new energy power generation enterprises will eventually evolve towards participating in the green power trading,positively affecting the decisions of two trading parties with increases in the consumption ratio,the implementation rate of medium and long-term contract for the green power,and the level of the government incentives.
green power tradingconsumption responsibility weightgovernment incentiveevolutionary game
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
维普
