首页|基于纳什谈判和主从博弈的多园区综合能源系统优化调度

基于纳什谈判和主从博弈的多园区综合能源系统优化调度

扫码查看
为充分考虑多园区综合能源系统(MCIES)中多利益主体间交易合作与多种能量间的耦合关系,提出了1种基于纳什谈判-主从博弈的点对点分布式交易策略.首先,建立考虑综合需求响应的MCIES主从博弈动态定价模型,以园区综合能源系统(CIES)运营商作为领导者,给下层用户制定动态电价与热价,用户响应电价与热价进行综合需求响应,CIES运营商根据用户的需求响应计划调整机组出力;其次,基于纳什谈判理论,建立包含主从博弈动态定价机制与CIES间合作博弈的MCIES双层优化模型;然后,将原问题等效为MCIES收益最大化子问题和合作收益分配最大化子问题,采用交替方向乘子法(ADMM)对模型进行求解.最后,仿真结果表明所提策略可实现CIES联盟利润的最大化,并合理分配收益,同时最小化用户用能成本.
Optimal Scheduling of Multi-park Integrated Energy System Based on Nash Negotiation And Master-slave Game
A peer-to-peer distributed trading strategy based on Nash negotiation&master-slave game is proposed to fully consider the coupling relationship between multi-stakeholder cooperation and multiple energies in multi-park Integrated Energy System(MCIES).Firstly,the MCIES master-slave game dynamic pricing model considering comprehensive demand response is established.Taking the integrated energy system operator of the Park(CIES)as the leader,the dynamic electricity price and heat price are formulated for the lower users.The users respond to the electricity price and heat price for comprehensive demand response.The CIES operator adjusts the unit output according to the user's demand response plan.Secondly,based on Nash negotiation theory,the MCIES double-layer optimization model is established,which includes the dynamic pricing mechanism of master-slave game and CIES cooperative game.Then,the original problem is equivalent to the MCIES benefit maximization subproblem and cooperative benefit maximization subproblem,and alternate direction multiplier method(ADMM)is used to solve the model.Finally,the simulation results show that the proposed strategy can maximize the profits of CIES alliance,distribute the profits reasonably,and minimize the energy cost of users.

multi-community integrated energy systempeer-to-peer tradingNash negotiationmaster-slave gamedynamic internal pricing

聂永辉、李宗锴

展开 >

东北电力大学电气工程学院,吉林吉林 132012

多园区综合能源系统 点对点交易 纳什谈判 主从博弈 动态内部定价

国家自然科学基金资助项目

61973072

2024

智慧电力
陕西省电力公司

智慧电力

CSTPCD北大核心
影响因子:0.831
ISSN:1673-7598
年,卷(期):2024.52(5)
  • 2
  • 25