On the Ex Ante Regulation of Dual-Monopoly by Super-Large Digital Platforms
With the continuous development of digital economy,super-large digital platforms are attempting to extend their monopoly in core markets into adjacent markets through a dual-monopoly strategy.This results in an"accelerated accumulation"of market dominance,which may suppress innovation,harm consumer welfare,and lead to risks such as data concentration,industrial consolidation,and media control.However,traditional antitrust regulatory approaches face challenges in this context,including difficulties in defining relevant markets,the inapplicability of"coercive"criteria for monopolistic behaviors,and the failure of merger notification standards to address dual-monopoly-related issues.These limitations prevent adequate response to the potential"structural barriers"created by dual-monopolies.Based on an analysis of these challenges,this paper proposes the introduction of ex ante regulatory tools.It advocates for refining competition analysis theories in digital markets,establishing a full-chain regulatory mindset,and advancing the classification and tiering of platforms.By tailoring the regulatory intensity and methods according to platform type and tier,this approach aims to effectively regulate dual-monopolies and mitigate their negative impacts from the outset.
dual-monopolysuper-large digital platformex ante regulationcompetition analysis theory
万方数据
维普
