Rule of Compensation Clawback and ESG Performance of State-Owned Enterprises
In the context of rampant irregularities in executive compensation,whether system of compensation clawback can play a governance role is crucial for implementing the accountability work of state-owned enterprises.This paper takes A-share state-owned enterprises(SOEs)on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2010 to 2021 as the sample and analyzes whether implementing system of compensation clawback can effectively alleviate the principal-agent problem between owners and executive team to improve ESG performance of enterprises.It is found that the implementation of system of compensation clawback significantly improves ESG performance of SOEs,which is achieved mainly through two mechanisms:enhancing risk awareness of executive team and suppressing their short termism behaviors.Heterogeneity tests show that the more detailed the terms or the wider scope of compensation of system of compensation clawback is,the more favorable it is for system of compensation clawback to play a positive role.Moreover,the promotion effect of system of compensation clawback on the fulfillment of ESG responsibilities in SOEs is mainly manifested in the enterprises where fewer members have professional backgrounds in the executive team,with lower shareholding ratio,with shorter expected tenure of CEOs,lack of academic experience,and in non-heavy pollution industries and government regulated industries.
ESG performancesystem of compensation clawbackshort termismrisk awareness
万方数据
维普
