The rationality of the income distribution system is the key to ensuring social fairness and justice.However,under the gradually emerging impact of executive compensation on corporate performance,the continuous increase in executive compensation has led to the common phenomenon of"sky-high compensation"for executives,which has a-roused widespread concern in the theoretical and practical circles.Based on China's special corporate governance sys-tem,this paper takes China's A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2021 as the sample,and examines whether and how the embeddedness of the party organization in corporate governance affects the executive-employee pay gap.The results show that the embedding of party organizations in corporate governance helps to sup-press the executive-employee pay gap,and the higher the degree of party organization embedding goes,the stronger the suppressing effect on the executive-employee pay gap will be.In addition,this suppressingeffect is more strongfor state-owned enterprises,enterprises with no political affiliation of the chairman or general manager,and enterprises with a low degree of marketization.Further research finds that the embedment of the party organization in corporate govern-ance can help suppress the executive-employee pay gap by inhibiting management power and reducing the level of cor-porate risk-taking.This paper explores the influencing factors and mechanisms of the executive-employee pay gap from the perspective of embedding the party organization in corporate governance with Chinese characteristics,which enri-ches relevant literature,and is of great significance for strengthening the construction of the party organization,promo-ting the organic combination of the party organization construction and the corporate governance structure,and optimi-zing the reform of the income distribution system.
关键词
党组织嵌入/高管—员工薪酬差距/收入分配/管理层权力/企业风险承担水平
Key words
embedment of party organization/executive-employee pay gap/income distribution/managerial power/enter-prise risk-taking
维普
万方数据