首页|大数据背景下制造商定价策略的演化博弈研究

大数据背景下制造商定价策略的演化博弈研究

扫码查看
大数据对制造商形成定价策略具有重要意义,在大数据背景下构建制造商定价策略的双群体演化博弈模型,解析制造商定价策略的演化稳定策略及影响因素。研究表明:给定对方定价策略,只要个人信息保护力度足够大,制造商更倾向于选择同一性定价策略,反之,更倾向于选择歧视性定价策略。当保护力度适中时,制造商定价策略演化与定制成本、信息搜集成本及制造商技术水平差距相关。个人信息保护力度及两家制造商可变成本质量成本系数之差通过影响演化稳定策略的吸引域对制造商定价策略系统演化产生影响,当混合均衡点存在时,系统演化受到单位信息搜寻成本、单位定制成本等影响,相关影响机理需做具体分析。
Manufacturer's Pricing Strategies in the Context of Big Data Based on Evolutionary Game Model
This paper focuses on constructing a bi-group evolutionary game model for manufacturers'pricing strategies under the big data background.The evolutionary strategiesand influencing factors of the manufacturers'pricing strate-gies to stable prices have been analyzed.The results of the research show that when the protection of personal informa-tion is strong enough,manufacturers are more inclined to choose the extension pricing strategiesas long as there is a given pricing strategy.Conversely,manufacturers are inclined to choose discriminatory pricing strategies.When the protection of personal information is moderate,the evolution of manufacturers'pricing strategies is related to the cost of customization,the cost of information collection,and the technological gap between manufacturers.Otherwise,the gap between variable cost and quality cost in two manufactures,and the protection level of personal information would both influence the system evolution by affecting the basin or domain of attraction on the evolutionary stable strategy.When the mixed equilibrium point exists,the point value is also affected by the information search cost per unit,the customi-zation cost per unit and etc.Due to the complexity of analysis,the relevant influencing mechanism needs to be further explored.

big dataextension pricingdiscriminatory pricingevolutionary game theory

郑天牧、郑月龙、蔡琴

展开 >

华夏银行重庆分行,重庆 400023

重庆工商大学工商管理学院,重庆 400067

大数据 同一性定价 歧视性定价 演化博弈

国家社会科学基金国家自然科学基金青年基金重庆市教委人文社会科学研究项目

20BJY0057230202722SKGH215

2024

西南大学学报(社会科学版)
西南大学

西南大学学报(社会科学版)

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:0.989
ISSN:1673-9841
年,卷(期):2024.50(2)
  • 26