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基于虚拟电厂区间主从博弈的车网互动优化调度

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为更好地挖掘电动汽车调节潜力,解决车网互动各主体的利益冲突,并克服分布式电源出力与负荷不确定性的影响,提出了基于虚拟电厂区间主从博弈的车网互动双层优化调度模型,将虚拟电厂聚合商作为上层,电动汽车用户作为下层.上层模型采用区间数描述源、荷的不确定性,以虚拟电厂聚合商的运营成本最低为优化目标,负责更新电价信息并传输至下层模型;下层模型以电动汽车用户满意度最大和成本最小为优化目标,负责求解用户充放电行为并返回至上层模型.采用融合区间可能度的改进粒子群算法,求解主从博弈最优调度结果.算例仿真表明:所提模型能够在削峰填谷的同时,统筹考虑聚合商与电动汽车用户的双边利益,并具有较好的鲁棒性.
Optimal Scheduling of Vehicle-network Interaction Based on Interval Stackelberg Game of Virtual Power Plant
To better exploit the regulation potential of electric vehicles(EVs),resolve the conflicts of interest among the stakeholders in vehicle-to-grid(V2G)interactions,and overcome the uncertainty of distributed energy sources and load,this paper proposes a two-level optimization scheduling model for V2G interactions based on the interval Stackelberg game of a virtual power plant(VPP).The VPP aggregator is considered as the upper level,and the EV users as the lower level.The upper level model uses interval numbers to describe the uncertainty of sources and loads,with the aim of minimizing the operating cost of the VPP aggregator,updating the electricity price information and transmitting it to the lower level model.The lower level model aims to maximize user satisfaction and minimize costs by solving the charging and discharging behavior of EV users and returning the results to the upper level model.The improved particle swarm optimization algorithm with integrated interval possibility degree is used to obtain the optimal scheduling results of the Stackelberg game.Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed model can effectively shave peak and fill the valley,coordinate the bilateral interests of the aggregator and EV users,and has good robustness.

electric vehiclesvehicle-network interactionvirtual power plantoptimal schedulingStackelberg gameinterval number

刘卫亮、闫倩文、张启亮、刘帅、刘长良、康佳垚、王昕

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华北电力大学自动化系,河北保定 071003

保定市综合能源系统状态检测与优化调控重点实验室,河北保定 071003

国家能源集团新能源技术研究院有限公司,北京 102209

电动汽车 车网互动 虚拟电厂 优化调度 主从博弈 区间数

国家自然科学基金国家能源集团科技项目中央高校基本科研业务费中央高校基本科研业务费中央高校基本科研业务费

62203172GJNY-21-982023JC0102023JG0052020MS117

2024

10.16182/j.issn1004731x.joss.23-0503

系统仿真学报
北京仿真中心 中国系统仿真学会

系统仿真学报

CSTPCD北大核心
影响因子：0.551
ISSN：1004-731X
年,卷(期)：2024.36(7)
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