As a result of destroying the social green innovation environment and hindering China's green development process,enterprise greenwashing has become a key problem to be solved urgently.Considering the perspective of firm heterogeneity,firstly,we construct a dynamic evolutionary game model between advantageous enterprises and disadvantageous enterprises under the"weak regulation",in order to analyze the evolution process and stable state of enterprises in the case of market punishment.Secondly,under the"strong supervision",we construct a dynamic evolutionary game model with the government,advantageous enterprises and disadvantageous enterprises,to analyze the strategic evolution process and stable state of the government and heterogeneous enterprises.Through model analysis and simulation with MATLAB,it is found that:first,the expected earnings directly affect the strategic choice of enterprises,that is,enterprises tended to choose green innovation strategies or greenwashing strategies which could bring higher income.Second,under the"weak regulation",the higher the proportion coefficient of firm heterogeneity,the inhibitory effect of market punishment on the greenwashing of superior enterprises is more obvious,but it has no governance effect on inferior enterprises.Third,under the"strong supervision",the government's appropriate rewards and punishments have a good governance effect on the green drift behavior of advantageous enterprises,however,the indifference government rewards and punishments for heterogeneous enterprises can't control the green drift of inferior enterprises.Therefore,we put forward the suggestion that the government should improve the ability of supervision to control the enterprises greenwashing by determining the regulatory focus of enterprises in different industries,activating social green consumption demand,making a top-level design,designing flexible reward and punishment mechanisms and strengthe-ning corporate social responsibility construction.
HeterogeneityGreenwashing GovernanceDynamic EvolutionMarket PenaltiesMechanism of Rewards and Punishments
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