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考虑风险规避的双渠道绿色供应链动态协调策略

Dynamic Coordination Strategy of Dual-channel Green Supply Chain Considering Risk Aversion

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由于产品绿色水平受制造商绿色投入努力的影响,考虑供应链成员均采取风险规避行为,建立了双渠道绿色供应链集中与分散式决策动态策略模型,通过二部定价成本共担契约协调供应链成员合作,并采用数值分析验证结果.研究表明:随时间推移,线上销量较高时,制造商绿色投入努力与消费者绿色偏好、制造商容忍度、协调契约下零售商容忍度正相关,与分散决策下零售商容忍度负相关;集中决策下产品绿色水平、制造商绿色投入努力、制造商直销价格、系统总利润均高于分散决策,零售商销售价格低于分散决策;当分担成本比例与固定费用满足一定条件时,二部定价成本共担契约能够完美协调供应链.
Since the green level of products is affected by the manufacturers'green investment intention,supply chain members begin to consider risk aversion behavior in the supply chain.Using the dual-channel green supply chain with risk aversion behavior model analyzes centralized and decentralized dual-channel decisions.And finally,through the two-part pricing cost-sharing contract,members are co-ordinated.The results are verified by numerical analysis.The research shows that:When online sales volume is high,manufacturers'green investment efforts are relevant to consumers'green preference,manufacturer's tolerance,and retailer's tolerance under coordination contracts,and negatively correlated with retailer's tolerance under decentralized decision-making;product green level,manufacturer's green investment effort,manufacturer's selling price,and total system profit under centralized decision-making are higher than those under decentralized decision-making,while retailer's selling price is lower than that under decentralized decision-making;when the cost-sharing ratio and the fixed cost meet certain conditions,the two-part pricing cost-sharing contract can perfectly coordinate the supply chain.

Risk AversionGreen Supply ChainDual-channel Supply ChainCost-sharing Contract for Two-part PricingDifferential Game

贡文伟、沈静静、丁凡、孙立成

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江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江 212001

风险规避 绿色供应链 双渠道供应链 二部定价的成本共担契约 微分博弈

国家自然科学基金资助项目

71874071

2024

系统工程
湖南省系统工程与管理学会

系统工程

CSTPCD北大核心
影响因子:0.721
ISSN:1001-4098
年,卷(期):2024.42(1)
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