Based on the government's pay ceiling order,this paper uses the data of China's listed state-owned enterprises in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2007 to 2018 to discuss the impact of compensation regulation on R&D investment and the moderating effect of internal and external governance mechanisms.By directly measuring the degree of compensation regulation and using the difference-in-differences(DID)model,we find that compensation regulation can reduce the compensation incentives of top executives and increase their motivation to avoid risks,which in turn inhibits the R&D investment of state-owned enterprises.Further research shows that management shareholding is helpful in alleviating the negative impact of compensation regulation on the R&D investment of state-owned enterprises.Compared with regions with low social trust,compensation regulation has less impact on R&D investment in regions with high social trust.This shows that the internal and external governance mechanisms can effectively restrain the adverse consequences of compensation regulation.Our findings deepen the understanding of the economic consequences of compensation regulation and have important significance for further promoting the compensation system reform of state-owned enterprises.
Compensation RegulationPay Ceiling OrderInternal and External Governance MechanismCorporate R&D Investment
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
