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考虑奖惩及绿证保底收购的配额主体决策

Research into Quota Holder Decisions Considering Awards and Penalties Mechanism and Guaranteed Acquisition of Green Certificates

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针对配额制政策设计的关键问题——配额主体的确立,在一个包含发电企业、电网企业和终端消费者的电力供销系统中,构建了面向配额主体的绿色电力消纳模型.根据配额制的政策设计,对强制配额机制、奖惩机制、奖惩+绿证保底收购机制进行理论建模.本文运用序贯博弈理论分析了不同机制下由电网企业和发电企业分别作为配额主体时的决策结果.研究表明:强制配额造成了配额主体的收益损失;惩罚机制加剧了收益损失程度,而追求奖励的行为则可弥补配额主体的收益损失;政府对绿证保底收购将导致常规发电企业收益减少,电网企业和绿色发电企业收益增加.以发电企业作为配额主体,电网企业和绿色发电企业的收益更高,各市场主体对绿证保底收购价格的低敏感性有利于此机制的退出.
Focusing on the key issue of the policy design of Renewable Portfolio Standards(RPS):the establishment of the quota holder,this paper formulates a green power absorption model in a power supply and consumption system including generators,grid company and end consumers.According to the design of RPS policy,the mechanism of the mandatory quotas,awards and penalties,and awards and penalties plus green certificates guaranteed acquisition are modelled.Sequential game theory is used to analyze the decisions of generators and grid companies when they respectively become the quota holder under these mechanism.Results show that the quota holder who is responsible for meeting the policy requirements will lose profits;Penalties force the quota holder to take larger profit losses while awards for participants help them lower their profit losses;Guaranteed acquisition of green certificates by the government results in a decrease in the profit of the traditional generator and an increase in the profit of the grid company and the green power generator.The grid company and green power generator have higher returns when the traditional power generator is the quota holder.The low sensitivity of market entities to green certificates guaranteed price is conducive to the exit of the mechanism of green certificates guaranteed acquisition.

Green PowerQuota HolderMandatory QuotasAwards and Penalties MechanismGuaranteed Acquisition

刘层层、黄健

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南京财经大学管理科学与工程学院,江苏南京 210023

绿色电力 配额主体 强制配额 奖惩机制 保底收购

2024

系统工程
湖南省系统工程与管理学会

系统工程

CSTPCD北大核心
影响因子:0.721
ISSN:1001-4098
年,卷(期):2024.42(6)