非理性偏好下动力电池再制造供应链最优决策与协调研究
Optimal Decisions and Coordination of Power Battery Remanufacturing Supply Chain Under Irrational Preferences
刘志 1王慧 2刘长义 1唐娟 1龚本刚1
作者信息
- 1. 安徽工程大学 经济与管理学院,安徽 芜湖 241000
- 2. 南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,南京 210016
- 折叠
摘要
考虑动力电池剩余容量不确定特征,构建由电池供应商和汽车制造商组成的再制造供应链,分别探讨决策双方完全理性、单向非理性偏好和双向非理性偏好等5种决策情形下的均衡解.研究发现:动力电池再制造容量起始点对回收量具有正向作用.在双向非理性偏好情形下,供应商的利他(公平)偏好程度增加导致制造商和系统总利润提高(降低),而自身利润总是降低;制造商的非理性偏好对供应链成员及系统利润的影响与供应商的非理性偏好程度有关.在单向非理性情形下,供应链成员的利他(公平)偏好程度增加导致自身利润下降(上升)而对方利润上升(下降).两部定价契约和收益共享契约能够实现双向非理性偏好情形下再制造供应链的协调.
Abstract
Considering the uncertain residual capacity of power batteries,this paper develops a remanufacturing supply chain(RSC)consisting of a battery supplier and an energy vehicle manufacturer,and discusses the equilibrium solutions under five decision-making scenarios,including non-irrational,single-irrational and bilateral-irrational preferences.The results show that,an increase in the remanufacturing capacity starting point enhances the collection quantity.Under the bilateral irrational preferences scenario,the increase of supplier's altruism(fairness)preference enhances(reduces)the profits of the manufacturer and system,while always reduces that of himself.The impact of the manufacturer's irrational preference on the profits is related to the degree of supplier's irrational preference.Under the single irrational preference scenario,an increase of the member's altruism(fairness)preference reduces(enhances)his own profit while enhances(reduces)another party's profit.A two-part tariff contract and a revenue sharing contract can coordinate the RSC under the bilateral irrational preferences scenario.
关键词
再制造供应链/废旧动力电池/非理性偏好/两部定价契约/收益共享契约Key words
remanufacturing supply chain(RSC)/used power batteries/irrational preferences/two-part tariff contract/revenue sharing contract引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
国家科技期刊平台
NSTL
维普
万方数据