Optimal Decisions and Coordination of Power Battery Remanufacturing Supply Chain Under Irrational Preferences
Considering the uncertain residual capacity of power batteries,this paper develops a remanufacturing supply chain(RSC)consisting of a battery supplier and an energy vehicle manufacturer,and discusses the equilibrium solutions under five decision-making scenarios,including non-irrational,single-irrational and bilateral-irrational preferences.The results show that,an increase in the remanufacturing capacity starting point enhances the collection quantity.Under the bilateral irrational preferences scenario,the increase of supplier's altruism(fairness)preference enhances(reduces)the profits of the manufacturer and system,while always reduces that of himself.The impact of the manufacturer's irrational preference on the profits is related to the degree of supplier's irrational preference.Under the single irrational preference scenario,an increase of the member's altruism(fairness)preference reduces(enhances)his own profit while enhances(reduces)another party's profit.A two-part tariff contract and a revenue sharing contract can coordinate the RSC under the bilateral irrational preferences scenario.
remanufacturing supply chain(RSC)used power batteriesirrational preferencestwo-part tariff contractrevenue sharing contract
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