Jump Bidding in Online Auctions with Soft Closing Mechanism
Using the rich data from online judicial auctions in China,this paper empirically investigated the performance and inherent mechanism of a common bidding strategy,i.e.,jumping bidding,in online auctions with a soft-closing mechanism.The result shows that jump bidding increases the probability of winning for bidders but at the same time,increases their payment cost.The signaling theory can better explain the phenomenon of jump bidding in online auctions.Due to the soft closing mechanism,jump bidding before delay is invalid.When the signal is stronger,there is less irrational jump bidding,and when bidders are sophisticated,the payment cost for using the jump bidding strategy is lower.The excessive payment cost may be the result of responding to market noise.
online auctionsjump biddingsoft closingsignaling theory
国家科技期刊平台
NSTL
万方数据
