Tournament Incentives for Transaction Process Considering Psychological Preferences in Large-Scale Water Resources Allocation Projects
Large-scale water resources allocation projects have the characteristics of linear distribution.The project legal person generally organizes multiple contractors to construction project in parallel,i.e.,trade with multiple contractors at the same time.From the perspective the principal-agent theory,this is a"one-to-many"principal-agent relationship.In this situation,the project legal person may face moral hazards originated from multiple contractors at the same time.This paper constructs a tournament incentive model that considers psychological preferences in the characteristics of large-scale water resources allocation projects,and analyzes the effect of wage gaps and psychological preferences on multi-contractor effort levels.The research results show that the contractor's optimal effort levels in terms of quality,construction period,and safety will increase with the increase in the tournament incentive gap,and decrease with the increase of the contractor's effort cost coefficients.In addition,the contractor's optimal effort levels will decrease with the increase of the sympathy preference coefficient,and increase with the increase of the jealous preference coefficient.Therefore,identifying the psychological preferences of multi-contractor and formulating an appropriate tournament incentive mechanism are of great significance to improve the construction performance in large-scale water resources allocation projects.
construction project managementwater resources allocation projectstournament incentivespsychological preferences
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