"Pick one of two"and antitrust of platform economy
By considering the imperfect competition among platforms and sellers,this paper investigates the incentives behind the"pick one of two"exclusive dealing used by asymmetric platforms,as well as potential effects on market competition,consumers,and welfare.The study finds that only when the platform differentiation is suficiently small and the homogeneity among sellers is strong,can dominant platform exclude its competitor by signing exclusive contracts with sellers in the form of"pick one of two."At this time,the"pick one of two"behavior will increase the commission level set by the platform,raise the price of seller's products,and ultimately reduce consumer surplus and social welfare.Therefore,prohibiting platforms from implementing"pick one of two"may not necessarily increase the profits of sellers and competing platforms,but it can increase consumer surplus and welfare.This suggests that the purpose of prohibiting the use of exclusive dealing such as"pick one of two"by platforms should not be to protect sellers or small competitive platforms,but to maintain consumer interest and guarantee the efficiency of platform markets.The paper clarifies some of the controversies in practice,provides theoretical support for the judgment of the anti-competitive effects of platform"pick one of two,"and provides practical guidance for regulating such behaviors in the platform economy.To determine whether the dominant platform's"pick one of two"behavior should be considered as an abuse of market dominance,it is necessary to comprehensively consider factors such as the number of sellers within the platform,the contract forms provided by the platforms,and the contract information disclosed by the platform,in addition to focusing on the degree of differentiation between platforms and the degree of competition among sellers within the platform.
platform economypick one of twoexclusive dealingantitrust
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