Theoretical and antitrust analysis of exclusive dealing with multiple platforms
Based on the theoretical framework of multiple competing platforms,two forms of exclusive contracts are investigated:Traditional exclusive contracts and"pick one of two"con-tracts.We distinguish the differences in the incentives of the dominant platform to use these contracts,and analyze the impact of the different forms of exclusive contracts on market compe-tition and the revenues of market participants.Our study shows that the degree of differentiation between platforms and between sellers are the core factors in determining the incentives for the dominant platform to use different forms of exclusive contracts and the impact on market partic-ipants.When the degree of differentiation between platforms and between sellers are both small,the dominant platform uses traditional exclusive contracts,while when the degree of differentia-tion between sellers is large,the dominant platform uses"pick one of two"contracts.Although both exclusive dealings reduce consumer surplus and social welfare,the impact on profits of other competing platforms and sellers is uncertain.Traditional exclusive contracts can reduce the prof-its of all competing platforms,whereas"pick one of two"contracts can reduce the profits of all sellers.This study provides a theoretical explanation for the use of different forms of exclusive dealing of platforms.
platform economyexclusive dealingpick one of twoantitrust