Blockchain traceability technology introduction strategy in the contract-farming supply chain
The development of rural industry enabled by blockchain technology is of great significance to the promotion of rural revitalization.Based on the consumer preference for"blockchain-tracked"agricultural products,this study established a game-theoretical model of a typical contract-farming supply chain composed of a farmer,a firm,and consumers,and inves-tigates the optimal strategy of blockchain traceability technology introduction.Through model analysis,this study compares the optimal decisions of blockchain node investment,planting area,and price under different blockchain introduction modes,as well as their impacts on the firm's profit,consumer surplus,and social welfare.The results show that,first,when the cost effect of blockchain investment is relatively small,only the firm(or downstream of the supply chain)introduces blockchain.When the cost effect of blockchain investment is relatively large,both farmer and firm(or the whole supply chain)will introduce blockchain.Second,the firm is more willing to introduce blockchain than the farmer,and the farmer has the incentive to"free-ride"and not introduce blockchain under certain conditions.Last,in equilibrium,the introduction strategy of blockchain is Pareto effective.However,when only the firm(or the downstream of the supply chain)introduces blockchain as an equilibrium strategy,the total consumer surplus and social welfare will suffer a certain loss.At this point,the firm or government can consider subsidizing farmers to avoid such losses.
blockchaincontract-farming supply chainagriculture digitizationsocial welfareanalytical model
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