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考虑动力电池回收的电动汽车制造商竞争与竞合策略选择

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针对一个具备动力电池技术的电动汽车制造商和一个缺乏动力电池技术的电动汽车制造商组成的系统,考虑电动汽车制造商回收退役动力电池的情形.在竞争、专利竞合及批发竞合三种模式下分别构建博弈模型并求解,分析电动汽车制造商竞争与竞合策略选择及退役动力电池回收决策.研究表明:1)最优策略(竞争、专利竞合或批发竞合)的选择取决于电动汽车制造商的议价能力、电动汽车替代程度、动力电池成本差异及退役动力电池回收利用价值;2)当两电动汽车制造商通过竞合策略(专利竞合或批发竞合)实现其利润的Pareto改进时,其整车价格也比竞争模式更低,即竞合策略对电动汽车制造商和消费者都有利,同时,缺乏动力电池技术的电动汽车制造商的退役动力电池回收率增加而具备动力电池技术的电动汽车制造商的退役动力电池回收率降低;3)具备动力电池技术的电动汽车制造商的退役动力电池回收率及利润均与动力电池回收利用价值呈正相关,动力电池回收利用价值对缺乏动力电池技术的电动汽车制造商的退役动力电池回收率及利润的影响取决于两制造商的竞争/竞合关系及动力电池成本差异.
The strategy choice between competition and co-opetition for electric vehicle manufacturers with battery recycling
A system with two rival electric vehicle manufacturers(EVMs)is considered,where one EVM has battery technology(BT)and the other hasn't BT.Each EVM recycles its own retired batteries.The game-theoretic models are constructed and solved under competition model,patent co-opetition model and wholesale co-opetition model,respectively.And then,the EVMs'strategy choices between competition and co-opetition,and the decisions for retired battery recycling are explored.It is shown that the choice of the optimal strategy(Competition,Patent co-opetition or Wholesale co-opetition)depends on the bargaining power of EVMs,the degree of substitution between electric vehicles produced by the two EVMs,the battery cost difference between the two EVMs and the recycling value of retired batteries.It is also shown that the Pareto improvement in co-opetition strategies(Patent co-opetition or Wholesale co-opetition)leads to increased profits and decreased vehicle prices,which is beneficial to both EVMs and consumers;in addition,the Pareto improvement in the co-opetition strategies leads to decreased(or increased)recycling rate of EVM with(without)BT.Furthermore,it is shown that the recycling rate of retired batteries and profit for EVM with BT is increasing in its recycling value regardless of competition or co-opetition,while the impact of the recycling value of retired batteries on the recycling rate and profit for EVM without BT depends on EVMs'competitive/coopetitive relationship and the battery cost difference between the two EVMs.

competitionpatent co-opetitionwholesale co-opetitionbattery recyclingbar-gaining power

冯中伟、晁乾坤、谭春桥

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河南理工大学工商管理学院能源经济研究中心,焦作 454000

中南大学商学院,长沙 410083

南京审计大学商学院,南京 211815

竞争 专利竞合 批发竞合 动力电池回收 议价能力

国家自然科学基金国家自然科学基金河南省高等学校重点项目河南理工大学杰出青年基金

719712187237113223B630003SKJQ2024-01

2024

系统工程理论与实践
中国系统工程学会

系统工程理论与实践

CSTPCDCSSCI北大核心
影响因子:1.575
ISSN:1000-6788
年,卷(期):2024.44(2)
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