首页|基于政府动态补贴区块链技术的闭环供应链决策与协调研究

基于政府动态补贴区块链技术的闭环供应链决策与协调研究

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考虑由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的闭环供应链,构建政府动态补贴区块链技术的集中决策和分散决策模型,并进行分析和比较.在此基础上,设计协调机制以最大程度发挥政府动态补贴的作用,保障闭环供应链的运作.研究表明:1)消费者的溯源偏好会促进闭环供应链引入区块链技术;2)政府动态补贴会降低产品批发价格,对促进产品循环利用和提升区块链溯源水平有积极影响,闭环供应链系统及其成员的利润增加.当消费者的溯源偏好低于某一特定阈值时,政府动态补贴会促使产品零售价格降低;3)集中决策下,闭环供应链的系统利润更高,回收努力成本分摊契约协调使分散决策下制造商和零售商收益达到双赢效果,通过非对称Nash均衡谈判能够实现契约协调后动态盈余收益的分配.本研究为政府有关部门的支持策略制定提供了理论依据,同时为闭环供应链企业引入区块链提供了重要的管理启示,有助于提升供应链的效率和可持续发展能力.
Research on closed-loop supply chain strategy and coordination based on government dynamic subsidy blockchain technology
Consider a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer.Construct centralized and decentralized decision models for the government's dynamic subsidy on blockchain technology and conduct an analysis and comparison.Based on this,design coordination mechanisms to maximize the effectiveness of government dynamic subsidies,ensuring the operation of the CLSC.The research indicates the following:1)Con-sumer preference for traceability promotes the adoption of blockchain technology in CLSCs.2)Government dynamic subsidies reduce wholesale prices,positively impacting the promotion of product recycling and the enhancement of blockchain traceability levels,increasing the profits of the CLSC system and its members.When consumer preference for traceability falls below a specific threshold,government dynamic subsidies lead to a reduction in product retail prices.3)Under centralized decision-making,the CLSC system achieves higher profits.Cost-sharing contracts for recycling efforts under decentralized decision-making result in win-win outcomes for manufacturers and retailers.Through asymmetric Nash equilibrium negotiations,the distri-bution of dynamic surplus gains after contract coordination can be realized.This study provides a theoretical basis for the formulation of support strategies by government departments and offers important managerial insights for CLSC enterprises when implementing blockchain technology.These insights contribute to enhancing supply chain efficiency and sustainability.

dynamic subsidyblockchainclosed-loop supply chaincoordinationNash negoti-ation

王玉燕、高俊宏

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山东财经大学管理科学与工程学院,济南 250014

动态补贴 区块链 闭环供应链 协调 Nash谈判

国家自然科学基金国家自然科学基金山东省高等学校青创科技支持计划济南市自主培养创新团队项目山东省"泰山学者"建设工程专项

71971129723711442019RWG017202228075tsqn202211197

2024

系统工程理论与实践
中国系统工程学会

系统工程理论与实践

CSTPCDCSSCI北大核心
影响因子:1.575
ISSN:1000-6788
年,卷(期):2024.44(3)
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