The core compromise solution for balanced games and its axiomatization
The core for balanced games with transferable utility characterizes all the allocations of payoffs when players solidly cooperate.Taking the minimal and maximal payoffs received by the players before and after the formation of cooperation respectively as reference points,this paper defines the vectors of minimal and maximal rights of the players,and further defines the unique efficient compromise of these two vectors as a new solution,called the core compromise solution.This paper analyses the relation among the core compromise solution,the τ-value and the core for balanced games,where the τ-value is another well-known compromise solution.This paper axiomatically characterizes the core compromise solution with the minimal rights priority property and the zero-normalized maximal rights proportionality property.Replacing the minimal rights priority property as the relatively invariance with respect to strategic equivalence,this paper provides another axiomatic characterization of the core compromise solution.Finally,this paper analyses the application of the core compromise solution,taking airport runway cost allocation as an example.
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