A new characterization of the Shapley-solidarity value with coalition structure
For cooperative games with coalition structure,Shapley-solidarity value is an impor-tant allocation rule and serves as a two-stage mechanism.In the first stage,players of the same priori union behave like one player and obtain the payoff according to the Shapley value,then in the second stage,the payoff obtained by the priori union is shared among its members according to the solidarity value.The Shapley-solidarity value not only reflects the fairness among priori unions,but also ensures the solidarity of players within the same priori union.In this paper,we propose a new basis of the TU-game space with given coalition structure.Based on the basis,we characterize the Shapley-solidarity value by axioms of efficiency,differential marginality be-tween components,differential marginality within components,and partial average null player property.
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