Green supply chain game models considering risk aversion under information asymmetry
This paper studies the optimal decisions of the green supply chain(GSC)under demand information asymmetry,and mainly focuses the following three situations:Both the manufacturer and the retailer are risk averse,only the retailer is risk averse,and only the man-ufacturer is risk averse.The impacts of risk-aversion coefficient and information asymmetry on the GSC members'optimal decisions and utilities are discussed.Then,the cost-sharing contracts are introduced to optimize the GSC's performance under three situations.The results show that:The GSC's equilibrium solutions are influenced by the value of risk-aversion coefficient,and the joint impact of green degree and retail price on the market demand;under three situations,infor-mation asymmetry always reduces the manufacturer's utility,and it is not necessarily beneficial to the retailer,which is related to the demand information value evaluated by the manufacturer;whether the information is symmetric or not,the preference sequences of the manufacturer and the retailer for three situations are fixed;meanwhile,given specific conditions,the cost-sharing contracts can improve the products'green degree and help the GSCs achieve Pareto improve-ments under three situations.
green supply chaininformation asymmetryrisk aversionStackelberg game
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