This paper studies the optimal decisions of the green supply chain(GSC)under demand information asymmetry,and mainly focuses the following three situations:Both the manufacturer and the retailer are risk averse,only the retailer is risk averse,and only the man-ufacturer is risk averse.The impacts of risk-aversion coefficient and information asymmetry on the GSC members'optimal decisions and utilities are discussed.Then,the cost-sharing contracts are introduced to optimize the GSC's performance under three situations.The results show that:The GSC's equilibrium solutions are influenced by the value of risk-aversion coefficient,and the joint impact of green degree and retail price on the market demand;under three situations,infor-mation asymmetry always reduces the manufacturer's utility,and it is not necessarily beneficial to the retailer,which is related to the demand information value evaluated by the manufacturer;whether the information is symmetric or not,the preference sequences of the manufacturer and the retailer for three situations are fixed;meanwhile,given specific conditions,the cost-sharing contracts can improve the products'green degree and help the GSCs achieve Pareto improve-ments under three situations.
green supply chaininformation asymmetryrisk aversionStackelberg game
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
