Risk resolution mechanism for the development of forestry carbon sink projects based on stochastic differential game
Taking the development of forestry carbon sink projects in shareholding cooperation mode as the research object,this paper focuses on the moral risks in the project development and the supervision strength of the regulatory authorities,constructs a stochastic differential game model between project development enterprises and foresters,and analyzes the conditions of spontaneous cooperation within the project and the mechanism of action of different external shocks on project development.It is found that firstly,in the case that the regulator imposes strong supervision on the project development enterprise and weak supervision on the forest farmer,and the proportion of carbon sink revenue allocation received by the forest farmer is lower than that of the project development enterprise,spontaneous cooperation within the project is formed,which alleviates the pressure of supervision.Second,tightening carbon quota increases the mean value of the price of carbon sinks,while including more industries and enterprises in carbon trading reduces the variance of the price of carbon sinks.To effectively motivate project participants in the initial phase,the implementation of a tight carbon quota or tax policy should take precedence,followed by the gradual inclusion of more industries and enterprises.Finally,the stricter the regulatory environment and the higher the proportion of carbon sink revenue allocation require the participating entities to make strategic adjustments in a shorter period of time,and the financial subsidies from the government do not have an impact on the speed of strategic adjustments,but incentivize the level of their behavioral efforts.
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