首页|高管会望"雨"而逃吗:极端强降水与高管机会主义减持——来自天气层面的证据

高管会望"雨"而逃吗:极端强降水与高管机会主义减持——来自天气层面的证据

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极端天气如何影响公司内部治理以及高管的自利行为,是探究气候变化微观经济后果的关键问题.本文利用2010-2020年中国各地级市天气情况与上市公司相匹配的数据,实证检验了极端强降水对高管机会主义减持行为的影响.研究发现,极端强降水的发生会导致企业价值被市场低估,股票流动性降低,企业也将面临更严重的融资约束问题.如果高管进行机会主义减持,则其减持收益更少、潜在风险更高.因此,极端强降水对高管机会主义减持行为起到了抑制作用.进一步研究发现,在空间布局较为集中与媒体报道相对较少的企业中,极端强降水的抑制作用更显著.本文从极端天气的角度拓展了高管机会主义减持行为的外部治理机制,同时进一步丰富了极端天气对微观企业经济行为的研究边界,对深入理解极端天气的经济后果具有一定意义.
Do executives run for the rain?Extreme rainfall and opportunistic stock selling behaviors of executives:Evidence from the weather level
The question of how extreme weather affects firms'internal governance and exec-utives'self-interested behavior is a key issue in exploring the microeconomic consequences of extreme weather.In this paper,we empirically examine the impact of extreme precipitation on executives'opportunistic stock selling behaviors using data matching weather conditions and listed firms in each prefecture-level city from 2010 to 2020.It is found that the occurrence of extreme precipitation leads to undervalued firms,reduced stock liquidity,and more severe fi-nancing constraints,and executives'opportunistic share reduction behavior is less rewarding and potentially more risky.Thus,extreme rainfall has a dampening effect on executives'opportunis-tic stock selling behaviors.Further research finds that the dampening effect is more pronounced in firms that are more geographically concentrated and have less media coverage.This paper expands the external governance mechanism of executives'opportunistic stock selling behavior from the perspective of extreme weather and further enriches the research boundary of the eco-nomic behavior of micro firms,which is of significance to the understanding of the economic consequences of extreme weather.

climate changeextreme rainfallstock selling of executives

马宁、蔡晓睿、靳光辉

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兰州大学管理学院,兰州 730000

气候变化 极端强降水 高管减持

2024

系统工程理论与实践
中国系统工程学会

系统工程理论与实践

CSTPCDCSSCI北大核心
影响因子:1.575
ISSN:1000-6788
年,卷(期):2024.44(10)