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恐怖分子跨国潜入的反恐安检资源配置研究

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考虑难民跨国流动安置过程中恐怖分子潜入问题,构建了政府防御部门和恐怖分子间的斯塔克伯格博弈模型.结合各个出入境口岸站点侦测概率的相关关系及恐怖分子在站点潜入成本差异,分析了恐怖分子最优潜入站点和政府防御部门安检资源优化配置问题.研究表明,站点潜入成本约束条件下,恐怖分子可供选择的最优潜入站点有所差异;在侦测概率呈现递减情景下,政府防御部门从恐怖分子潜入站点到后续安检站点间配置资源并非是均等的.
Study of anti-terrorism security resource allocation in transnational terrorism
Considering the terrorist's infiltration in the process of the refugees' transnational flows,a Stackelberg model between the defender and the terrorist is formulated based on the detection probability correlation among different entry and exit ports and the entry costs of terrorists,and the terrorists' optimal infiltration site and the optimal resource allocation of the defender are analyzed.The results show that under the constraints of the terrorists' entry costs,the optimal infiltration site is different.When the detection probability has a decreasing correlation among different sites,resource allocations from the terrorist's infiltration site to subsequent sites are not equal

Stackelberg modelsecurity resource allocationterrorismrefugee resettlemententry and exit ports

柴瑞瑞、刘德海、陈静锋

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东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院,辽宁大连116025

大连理工大学系统工程研究所,辽宁大连116024

Stackelberg模型 安检资源配置 恐怖主义 难民安置 出入境口岸

国家自然科学基金资助项目国家自然科学基金资助项目国家自然科学基金资助项目国家自然科学基金资助项目

71271045715710337150303371602021

2017

系统工程学报
中国系统工程学会

系统工程学报

CSTPCDCSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.192
ISSN:1000-5781
年,卷(期):2017.32(3)
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