Cooperation for transnational river pollution control:A differential game model
In order to improve the effect of pollution control in the case of unidirectional externality of transna-tional river pollution,this paper employs the method of differential game and constructs three pollution control modes:The one where pollution is controlled by each country alone,the pollution compensation mode,and"who pollutes,who controls"mode.Then,this paper analyzes the continuous dynamic changes of pollution control decisions in two upstream and downstream countries,and obtains the equilibrium levels of the pollu-tion discharge,pollution control and social welfare of the upstream and downstream countries under the three modes.The research shows that only when the unit pollution control cost due to technological progress is small and the loss of pollution is within a certain range,the mode of"who pollutes,who controls"can improve both pollution control and economic development.The pollution compensation mode is more favorable for the downstream country when the pollution loss is small,while the mode of controlling pollution alone is better when the pollution loss is large.The downstream country is better to choose the mode of"who pollutes,who controls"when the loss of pollution is within a certain range.
cooperation on pollution controldifferential gamepollution of transnational riversthe pollution control mode
万方数据
维普
