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"双积分"政策下的汽车竞合供应链策略选择

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构建了不合作、价格折扣与成本分担策略模型,研究了"双积分"政策对燃油汽车制造商(GV)和新能源汽车制造商(EV)生产策略的影响.研究表明:三种策略下,当积分价格较低(高)时,市场规模的扩大,成本效率系数和电池价格的下降会诱导GV提高(降低)燃油汽车产量和燃油经济性水平;成本分担策略下GV的利润始终最高,EV在积分价格较低时选择不合作策略利润更高,积分价格较高时选择价格折扣策略利润更高;成本分担策略应当制定更低的价格折扣合同才能激励EV参与协同研发.以上结论说明当积分价格较低时,市场规模的扩大,成本效率系数和电池价格的下降会削弱"双积分"政策的实际效果,这为汽车制造商提供了一定的管理启示.
The strategic choice of co-opetition automobile supply chain under"dual-credit"policy
Three strategies:non-cooperation(N),price-discount(D)and cost-sharing(S)strategies,are es-tablished to analyze the impact of"dual credit"policy on the production strategies of the gasoline vehicle manufacturer(GV)and the new energy vehicle manufacturer(EV).The results show that when the credit price is lower(higher),the increase in market size,decrease in cost efficiency factor and battery price will induce GV to increase(decrease)the production of G-vehicles and fuel economy level.The profit of GV is always the highest under the S strategy.The profit of EV is higher under the N strategy when credit price is lower,while profit of EV is higher under the D strategy when credit price is higher.The S strategy should set a lower price discount than D strategy to attract EV to participate in collaborative R&D.The above findings suggest that larger market sizes,lower battery prices and lower cost efficiency factors will weaken the actual effect of the"dual credit"policy when the credit price is lower,which also provides some important management insights for automotive manufacturers.

"dual-credit"policyautomotive co-opetition supply chainfuel economyE-vehicle

胡文婕、马成霖、赵骅、董滔

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重庆工商大学企业管理研究中心,重庆 400067

重庆工商大学工商管理学院,重庆 400067

天津大学管理与经济学部,天津 300072

西南大学电子信息工程学院,重庆 400700

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"双积分"政策 汽车竞合供应链 燃油经济性 新能源汽车

国家社会科学基金重庆工商大学科研项目

21BGL255ctbuesd46

2024

系统工程学报
中国系统工程学会

系统工程学报

CSTPCD北大核心
影响因子:1.192
ISSN:1000-5781
年,卷(期):2024.39(1)
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