To clarify the impact of subcontractor's horizontal fairness on the contract design and expected re-turn of public sector under random dependence and technology dependence in the public goods technological innovation,this paper constructed a single-principal and dual-agents model based on fairness.The results show that random dependence and subcontractor's fairness have opposite effects on the indirect incentive coefficient,which determines the optimal contract type.However,the adjusted reward distribution of the public sector favored the party with stronger fairness,which makes it the optimal choice to provide the subcontractor team performance contract.The public sector's incentive adjustment for the fair preference of subcontractors can benefit itself,but the relative contribution of subcontractors cannot be ignored,otherwise the incentive adjust-ment is counterproductive.Therefore,if the public sector wants to benefit from the adjustment of incentive intensity,it must coordinate the fairness preference and contribution of both sides.
关键词
公共产品技术创新/联合研发/公平偏好/双重依赖/合同类型
Key words
public goods technological innovation/joint R&D/fairness preference/dual dependence/contract type
维普
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