This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells its products directly or through a retailer to consumers.Both the manufacturer and the retailer can offer complimentary extended warranties to attract consumers to register information for potential benefits.Based on this framework,this paper examines the effects of offering complimentary extended warranty and consumers'channel preferences on the price and the profit of supply chain members.The results show that the suppliers of complimentary extended warranties charge higher retail prices.The manufacturer increases the wholesale price when the re-tailer provides a complimentary extended warranty.Offering complimentary extended warranties makes supply chain members more profitable,but their profits may not necessarily be the highest when the complimentary extended warranty are provided by themselves.Furthermore,when the manufacturer provides complimentary extended warranties for both channels,it is always optimal for the manufacturer to provide the warranty him-self,but it may not always result in a higher profit for the retailer.These results can provide a theoretical basis for firms to implement complimentary extended warranties in practice.
关键词
免费延保/双渠道供应链/定价策略/博弈论
Key words
complimentary extended warranty/dual-channel supply chain/pricing strategy/game theory
维普
万方数据