Comparative analysis on dynamic decisions of service in a tourism O2O supply chain
An'online-offline'tourism supply chain system consisting of a travel product supplier and an online travel agency is studied using the theory of differential game.The firms make dynamic service investment to improve the tourists'satisfaction.The influences of key parameters on the equilibrium solutions are analyzed by comparing the equilibrium strategies under three cooperation scenarios.The results indicate that,under the service-incentive scenario,the equilibrium solutions of tourism product price and tourists'satisfaction depend on the efficiency of the supplier's service investment.The cost-sharing scenario can not only motivate the supplier to increase service investment,but also motivate the travel agency to increase online service investment when the supplier's service investment efficiency is high.Numerical examples show that there is an optimal cost-sharing ratio for off-line service investment.Within an appropriate range of cost-sharing ratio,the Pareto improvement in supply chain performance can be achieved even under a high transfer payment.The marginal incentive of the supplier has a greater impact on the profit of the supply chain under higher transfer payments.