Financing strategy of Chinese port enterprises based on the game perspective
This article studies a financing model for upgrading and innovating port enterprises to alleviate the significant burden on both government and businesses.After analyzing the investment and financing process,a game theory model is proposed with local government and port enterprises as decision-making entities.It reveals that,when the benefits of innovation and upgrading are uncertain,the government's support strategy significantly affects the enterprise's upgrade decisions,but such support is not stable due to cost considerations.To address the instability and lack of sustainability,this article proposes a project financing model involving state-owned capital.A signaling game model demonstrates that the investors'judgment of the authenticity of the bidding information released by the enterprise is crucial for the project's sustainable support.The reliability of the information regarding Chinese port enterprises ensures the feasibility of this financing model,which is further validated through case simulations.
game theoryfinancing strategyport enterprisegovernment supportfinancing management
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
