基于博弈视角的我国港口企业融资策略
Financing strategy of Chinese port enterprises based on the game perspective
鲁渤 1邱伟权2
作者信息
- 1. 大连理工大学经济管理学院,辽宁大连 116024
- 2. 东北财经大学工商管理学院,辽宁大连 116025
- 折叠
摘要
为解决港口企业创新升级所造成的较大政企负担问题,从投融资全过程角度进行研究,提出一种港口企业创新升级的融资模式.首先建立以地方政府和港口企业为决策主体的演化博弈模型,发现当创新升级效益具有不确定性时,企业选择升级策略取决于政府对港口企业的支持策略,但政府会视支持成本考虑支持与否,不是稳定均衡.针对稳定性与持续性不够强的问题提出引入国有资本的项目融资模式,信号博弈模型分析显示,国有资本投资人对企业发布的招标信息的真实性判断是项目支持可持续的关键,而投资人所获我国港口企业信息的真实性有保障,以及案例模拟进一步反向验证了此项目融资模式的可行性.
Abstract
This article studies a financing model for upgrading and innovating port enterprises to alleviate the significant burden on both government and businesses.After analyzing the investment and financing process,a game theory model is proposed with local government and port enterprises as decision-making entities.It reveals that,when the benefits of innovation and upgrading are uncertain,the government's support strategy significantly affects the enterprise's upgrade decisions,but such support is not stable due to cost considerations.To address the instability and lack of sustainability,this article proposes a project financing model involving state-owned capital.A signaling game model demonstrates that the investors'judgment of the authenticity of the bidding information released by the enterprise is crucial for the project's sustainable support.The reliability of the information regarding Chinese port enterprises ensures the feasibility of this financing model,which is further validated through case simulations.
关键词
博弈论/融资策略/港口企业/政府支持/融资管理Key words
game theory/financing strategy/port enterprise/government support/financing management引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家社科基金重大资助项目(20&ZD129)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72073018)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72261147705)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(T2241025)
辽宁省兴辽计划青拔资助项目(XLYC2007191)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据