Optimal patent licensing and SR investment strategy under asymmetric information
Considering a supply chain consisting of a patent holder,a brand manufacture,and an original equip-ment manufacturer(OEM),the paper investigates the optimal social responsibility(SR)investment decisions and patent licensing contracts design in the presence of asymmetric information.A multi-stage dynamic game model under asymmetric information is established.The optimized supply chain equilibrium can be obtained through solving the model.Moreover,the effects of the SR investment and information sharing are analyzed.The results show that the optimal licensing contract is the two-part tariff licensing contract,which reveals mar-ket demand information.There is a feasible condition for brand manufacturer to choose the SR investment,but the choice of licensing contract will not be affected by SR.In addition,SR is beneficial to consumer surplus and social welfare.Finally,when the patent holder's bargaining power satisfies certain conditions,the brand manufacturer will share the supply chain's profit with the patent holder and Pareto improvement is realized.
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