复合型电商平台的演化路径分析
Evolution path of hybird e-commerce platform
张凯1
作者信息
- 1. 上海理工大学管理学院,上海 200093
- 折叠
摘要
针对电商平台平台演化路径问题,构建了 一个代表性复合型电商平台模型,比较"先平台后自营"与"先自营后平台"两条演化路径的差异,研究平台自营和第三方卖家的最优进入策略.研究发现:第三方卖家在"先自营后平台"模式始终获得较大的利润,而复合型电商平台在哪种模式获得较大利润取决于第三方卖家数量的多少;"先平台后自营"模式和"先自营后平台"模式均为纳什均衡解,且不受第三方卖家边际成本的影响.之后,将平台自营的不进入策略、保守型第三方卖家两个因素依次引入基本模型.进一步发现,当扣点率较小(大)时,复合型电商平台(纯平台)模式是纳什均衡解;若冒险型和保守型第三方卖家数量恒定不变,无论是哪种卖家,其均衡利润都与保守型第三方卖家数量呈倒U型关系.复合型电商平台运营者应采取适当限制第三方卖家数量,并控制平台开放速度.
Abstract
According to the evolution paths of hybird e-commerce platform,this paper builds a representative hybird e-commerce platform model,and investigates two different evolution paths,"agency selling first,re-selling later(referred as FL)"and"reselling first,agency selling later(referred as LF)",and also analyze the first-party seller's and third-party sellers'optimal entry strategy.The result indicates that third-party sellers always obtain more profits in LF than in FL,while the hybird e-commerce platform has an ambiguous result depending on the number of third-party sellers.Both FL and LF are Nash equilibriums,no matter whether third-party sellers have a marginal cost advantage.Finally,After incorporating no-entry strategy of the platfor-m,defensive third-party sellers into the basic model subsequently,this paper concludes that hybird model is a Nash equilibrium when the revenue sharing rate is small no matter what evolution path is,while pure reselling model is a Nash equilibrium when the revenue sharing rate is high.Given the total number of defensive and offensive third-party sellers,every seller has an inverse U-ship relation with the number of defensive third-party sellers.The hybird e-commerce platform owner should limit the number of third-party sellers and control the speed of openness.
关键词
复合型电商平台/第三方卖家/平台自营/演化路径Key words
hybird E-commerce platform/third-party seller/reselling model/evolution path引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72372105)
上海理工大学管理学院引进人才科研启动资助项目(YJRC202103)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据