According to the evolution paths of hybird e-commerce platform,this paper builds a representative hybird e-commerce platform model,and investigates two different evolution paths,"agency selling first,re-selling later(referred as FL)"and"reselling first,agency selling later(referred as LF)",and also analyze the first-party seller's and third-party sellers'optimal entry strategy.The result indicates that third-party sellers always obtain more profits in LF than in FL,while the hybird e-commerce platform has an ambiguous result depending on the number of third-party sellers.Both FL and LF are Nash equilibriums,no matter whether third-party sellers have a marginal cost advantage.Finally,After incorporating no-entry strategy of the platfor-m,defensive third-party sellers into the basic model subsequently,this paper concludes that hybird model is a Nash equilibrium when the revenue sharing rate is small no matter what evolution path is,while pure reselling model is a Nash equilibrium when the revenue sharing rate is high.Given the total number of defensive and offensive third-party sellers,every seller has an inverse U-ship relation with the number of defensive third-party sellers.The hybird e-commerce platform owner should limit the number of third-party sellers and control the speed of openness.
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