This paper focuses on a supply chain consisting of a supplier,an e-tailer and a logistics service provider.By considering the supplier's offline encroachment and online distribution contract,four game mod-els are established in two scenarios:when the e-tailer integrates logistics service provider and when it does not.By analyzing the equilibrium solutions of these models,the supplier's optimal strategies of offline encroach-ment and online distribution facing the e-tailer's different logistics integration strategies are derived.The results show that the supplier's optimal strategies of offline encroachment and online distribution always depend on the price competition between two channels.Additionally,the effects of the price competition between two channels on supplier's optimal strategies for selling products through e-tailers with different logistics integra-tion strategies are different.In addition,the supplier's offline encroachment always hurts the e-tailer.When the supplier encroaches on offline market,the supply chain's performance always increases with the price com-petition between two channels and is the maximized when the supplier chooses a revenue sharing contract to cooperate with the integrated e-tailer.The results provide theoretical suggestions for supplier's strategies of offline encroachment and online distribution.
维普
万方数据