Government subsidy mechanism considering weather index insurance in a contract-farming supply chain
Agricultural production is threatened by natural disasters and farmers are facing difficulties in sales.This induces governments to propose subsidy policies to improve these problems.One natural question is which subsidy policy can ensure effectiveness.To answer this question,this paper builds a Stackelberg game decision-making model for a contract-farming supply chain with farmers,agribusinesses,governments,and insurance companies under the weather index insurance framework.The goal is to study the impacts of production cost and purchase price subsidies on each member of the supply chain.The research shows that production cost subsidy might be detrimental for the farmers,but purchase price subsidy will increase the utility of farmers.When the weather index is small(large),indicating that farmers receive less(more)compensation,purchase price(production cost)subsidies can better improve the utility of the farmers and the benefits of agribusinesses.Additionally,providing production cost subsidies is more effective in improving social welfare.
natural disasterweather index insurancecontract-farming supply chainproduction cost subsidypurchase price subsidy
万方数据
维普
