首页|Design and pricing of maintenance service contract based on Nash non-cooperative game approach
Design and pricing of maintenance service contract based on Nash non-cooperative game approach
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NETL
NSTL
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维普
Nowadays manufacturers are facing fierce challenge.Apart from the products,providing customers with multiple maintenance options in the service contract becomes more popu-lar,since it can help to improve customer satisfaction,and ulti-mately promote sales and maximize profit for the manufacturer.By considering the combinations of corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance,totally three types of maintenance ser-vice contracts are designed.Moreover,attractive incentive and penalty mechanisms are adopted in the contracts.On this basis,Nash non-cooperative game is applied to analyze the revenue for both the manufacturer and customers,and so as to optimize the pricing mechanism of maintenance service contract and achieve a win-win situation.Numerical experiments are con-ducted.The results show that by taking into account the incen-tive and penalty mechanisms,the revenue can be improved for both the customers and manufacturer.Moreover,with the increase of repair rate and improvement factor in the preventive maintenance,the revenue will increase gradually for both the parties.
maintenance service contractNash gameincen-tive and penalty mechanismcorrective maintenancepreventive maintenance
SU Chun、HUANG Kui
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School of Mechanical Engineering,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
维普
