首页|Customer Joining Behavior and Regulation Strategy in Visible Multi-Server Queues with Synchronous Vacations of Partial Servers

Customer Joining Behavior and Regulation Strategy in Visible Multi-Server Queues with Synchronous Vacations of Partial Servers

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This paper studies customer joining behavior and system regulation strategy in non-exhaustive visible M/M/m queues with synchronous vacations of a part of the servers.Once this part of the servers are idle,they take multiple vacations simultaneously(vacation period).Until there are customers waiting in the queue,they are reactivated and all servers are busy or idle(busy period).The authors call this part of the servers as"partial servers".In view of the fully visible queue and the almost visible queue,the authors obtain customers'equilibrium joining threshold strategies and their socially optimal joining threshold strategies,respectively,and observe that customer joining behavior in equilibrium generally makes the system overcrowded,which makes the equilibrium social welfare lower than the optimal social welfare.After regulation,interestingly,for optimizing social welfare,the system manager hopes not only customers arriving in vacation period pay attention to the number of partial servers,but also customers arriving in busy period should care about it rather than ignore.Moreover,arranging more servers for vacation does not necessarily lead to the decrease of social welfare on condition that the number of partial servers is close to m.As for the information advantage of the fully visible case,it is not obvious for increasing social welfare and even unfavorable to servers'profit unless the number of partial servers is big enough.Furthermore,given the different composition of so-cial welfare,there exists the optimal number of partial servers and the optimal arrival rate of customers for maximizing social welfare.

Customer behaviornon-exhaustive servicepartial serversregulation strategysynchronous vacationsvisible queue

SUN Wei、WANG Hao、XIE Xumeng、LI Shiyong

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School of Economics and Management,Yanshan University,Qinhuangdao 066004,China

国家自然科学基金Humanities and Social Science Fund of Ministry of Education of China河北省自然科学基金河北省自然科学基金

7197118822YJCZH086G2023203008G2022203003

2024

10.1007/s11424-024-2143-2

系统科学与复杂性学报(英文版)
中国科学院系统科学研究所

系统科学与复杂性学报(英文版)

EI
影响因子：0.181
ISSN：1009-6124
年,卷(期)：2024.37(3)
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