首页|Trade Credit and Buyer Financing

Trade Credit and Buyer Financing

扫码查看
原文链接
  • NETL
  • NSTL
  • 维普
  • 万方数据
This study investigates trade credit and early payment financing in a three-party supply chain consisting of a manufacturer,a capital-constrained distributor,and a retail platform.The manufacturer or the platform provides the financing service to the distributor.Two different leadership structures are investigated,namely,platform and manufacturer leadership Stackelberg game,where the platform or manufacturer first makes the decision,respectively.Under trade credit financing,the manufacturer and the whole supply chain face loss when the commission rate increases.However,under buyer financing,they benefit from the high commission rate.Under platform leadership,the distributor,the manufacturer,and the supply chain perform better with trade credit if and only if the commission rate is small or the production cost is high,while the platform always prefers buyer financing.Under manufacturer leadership,the distributor,manufacturer,and supply chain perform better with trade credit under low production cost and commission rate.The platform prefers trade credit when production cost is in the intermediate range.By further analyzing the case that both financing channels are available and the distributor decides which one to choose,we find that the financing services competition hurts only the platform's profits.And under certain conditions,trade credit and early payment can achieve the same performance for every supply chain member.These findings enhance our understanding of the supply chain risk allocation efficiency of trade credit and early payment financing under different leadership structures.Neither risk allocation form outperforms the other,and the relative efficiency depends on supply chain characteristics.

Supply chain financesupply chain risk allocationpayment termgame theory

Weihua Zhou、Yulin Hu、Tiantian Lin、Zhigang Ding

展开 >

School of Management,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310058,China

Cardinal Operations,Shanghai 200433,China

Business School,Shaoxing University,Shaoxing 312000,China

National Key R&D Program of China under grantKey R&D Pro-gram of Zhejiang Province under grantNational Natural Sci-ence Foundation of China under grantNational Natural Sci-ence Foundation of China under granteditors and anonymous referees for their constructive comments to significantly improve the paper.

2019YFB14049012021C011047219282371821002

2022

10.1007/s11518-022-5530-z

系统科学与系统工程学报(英文版)
中国系统工程学会

系统科学与系统工程学报(英文版)

CSCDSCIEI
影响因子：0.138
ISSN：1004-3756
年,卷(期)：2022.31(3)
  • 23