共识博弈与区块链生态共识均衡
Consensus game and consensus equilibrium in blockchain ecology
袁先智1
作者信息
- 1. 中山大学管理学院,广东广州 510275;华东理工大学商学院,上海 200237;重庆理工大学理学院,重庆 400054
- 折叠
摘要
本文的目的是建立刻画区块链生态系统行为表现的"共识博弈"的一般框架,并针对"矿池间隔博弈"的"共识均衡"的存在性进行刻画和解读.特别是通过引进共识博弈这个新概念作为出发点,尽管区块链平台生态本身会受到诸如挖矿间隔等行为的干扰,我们证明了在合理的激励机制下一般区块链平台的共识博弈均衡点的存在性,从正面的角度回答了区块链生态本身发展是否稳定这个非常基本和核心的问题.这里,"间隔博弈"(不良)行为出现所在的区块链生态是指基于Nakamoto在2008年提出的遵循按照最长主链建设的"工作量证明"作为基本的共识原则的挖矿平台.特别地,本文首先在一般激励机制条件下,基于区块链生态中的共识博弈框架,在有挖矿间隔等不良行为出现的情况下,建立了在一般激励相容机制条件下的共识均衡点的存在性结果和对应区块链生态能够持续运转的稳定性解读;然后结合在"挖(币)矿"工作中涉及到的工作费用、奖励机制和挖矿能力这三类描述激励机制的核心要素,从挖矿工(组)收益的角度,针对不同嵌入场景对挖矿工(组)的"间隔博弈行为"可能产生的影响进行了解读和分析.本文的理论结果和案例分析表明,结合不同挖矿场景相合适的激励相容机制,共识博弈(均衡)这个概念可以在理论的层面(即,不需要情景数据模拟结果的支持),能够得到或形成针对不同场景下的挖矿行为的解释和解读.此外,我们有理由期待和相信,结合影响挖矿(组)收益相关的要素因子,共识博弈可以帮助我们构建对应的合适场景的激励相容机制,通过刻画挖矿工(组)出现的诸如"间隔行为","分叉链","矿池攻击"等(不良)行为,支撑数字经济的健康发展,并对共识经济学基础理论的发展能够起到推进作用.
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to establish a general framework for"Con-sensus Game"that characterizes the behavior of blockchain ecosystems,and to address behaviors of the"Mining Pool Gap Game",that is,we first give the characterizing and interpreting the behavior of"Consensus Equilibria",and establishing and explaining the stability of the blockchain platform itself with the positive answer based on the exis-tence of consensus equilibrium through the new concept called"consensus game"in the presence of mining gap(game)behavior,here,the blockchain ecosystem where"Gap Game"is located refers to a mining platform based on the consensus principle of"Proof of Work"(PoW)with longest chain rules(LCR)proposed by Nakamoto in 2008.Specif-ically,this paper first establishes the existence of general consensus equilibrium and the corresponding stability results for continuous operation of the blockchain ecosystem un-der general incentive mechanism conditions,based on the consensus game framework in the blockchain ecosystem.Then,combined with the three main factors involved in"mining Bitcoin"work,including work costs,reward mechanisms,and mining capabil-ities,from the perspective of mining miner(group)profits,it interprets and analyzes the potential impact of different embedding scenarios on the"gap game behavior"of mining miners(groups).The theoretical results and case analysis of this article indicate that by combining appropriate incentive compatibility mechanisms for different mining scenarios,the concept of consensus game(equilibrium)can obtain or form a consistent explanation and interpretation of mining behavior in different scenarios without simu-lation results of scenario data.In addition,we have reason to expect and believe that consensus games,combined with factors related to mining(group)profits,can help us build appropriate incentive compatibility mechanisms.By characterizing behaviors such as"interval behavior","branching chains",and"mining pool attacks",we can support the healthy development of the digital economy and promote the development of basic theories of consensus economics.
关键词
共识博弈/共识均衡/合作与非合作博弈/Nakamoto共识/工作量证明/区块链生态/区块链生态稳定性/矿池博弈/挖矿间隔博弈/最长链规则/区块链的分叉/激励兼容性Key words
consensus game/consensus equilibrium/cooperative and non-cooperative games/nakamoto consensus/proof of work/blockchain ecosystems/blockchain stability/mining pool gap game/longest chain rules(LCR)/fork of blockchain/incentive compati-bility引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据