Short-selling and Corporate Information Transparency
The relationship between short-selling and earnings management has long aroused an interest in the academic community.ANGEL et al.(2004)found that short selling generally occurs before a company releases a negative earnings announcement,indicating that short sellers have the ability to mine trait information and thus have a certain deterrent effect on corporate behavior.Their conclusion is supported by subsequent empirical research.Since 2010,the impact of short selling mechanisms on earnings management of Chinese listed companies has also attracted attention from the domestic academic community.This type of literature mainly examines the impact of the increase of two financing targets on corporate earnings management.However,the research by SU and NI(2018)shows that there are two problems when using the two finan-cing targets as explanatory variables:Firstly,financing and short selling are different.The impact of the two on corporate earnings management is significantly different.Secondly,regulatory authorities usually use company level indicators as the decision-making basis,and these characteristics are closely related to corporate behavior,which can further affect whether it can become two financing targets.Therefore,there is an endogeneity problem of mutual influence between the two financing targets and corporate behavior.In fact,after the implementation of margin trading and securities lending,the financing scale far exceeds the margin trading scale.In order to alleviate the shortage of securities in the short selling market,China Securities and Finance Corporation implemented the securities lending business for 98 margin trading stocks from February 28,2013.Afterwards,three more expansions were carried out.After the implementation of this system,Chinese securities and financial companies can borrow stocks from shareholders of listed companies,lend them to securities firms,and then borrow securities from short sellers through securities firms.This system effectively alleviates the problem of insufficient securities sources.From this,it can be seen that after the introduction of the Qualified Securities for Short-sale Refinancing system in China,there has been an exogenous increase in the supply of tradable stocks.Pessimistic traders in the market can better express heterogeneity views and integrate more information into stock prices.This article uses data from one year before and after the implementation of the Qualified Securities for Short-sale Refinancing system in 2013(2012-2014)to examine the causal relationship between the relaxation of short selling constraints and corporate earnings management using the double difference method.We find that,firstly,benchmark regression indicates that after the relaxation of short selling constraints,earnings management signifi-cantly decreases;secondly,heterogeneity analysis shows that the inhibitory effect of relaxing short selling con-straints on earnings management is more pronounced in high growth enterprises and private enterprises;finally,in the examination of the mechanism of action,it is found that the relaxation of short selling constraints mainly has an inhibitory effect on earnings management through the executive equity compensation channel.The above research indicates that regulatory authorities should continuously improve the securities lending system and reduce the cost of short selling transactions in order to lay a solid foundation for regulating corporate behavior and effectively protecting investors in the capital market.We suggest that subsequent literature can examine the economic consequences of the Qualified Securities for Short-sale Refinancing system from the following two aspects:on the one hand,the impact of the Qualified Securities for Short-sale Refinancing system on corporate investment can be examined.Previous literature on the relationship between short selling and corporate investment has faced strong endogeneity issues,and the external impact can be used to alleviate endogeneity problems,thus obtaining the causal impact of short selling on corpo-rate investment;on the other hand,future literature can also examine the impact of the Qualified Securities for Short-sale Refinancing system on the pricing efficiency of the capital market.In existing literature on short selling mechanisms and pricing efficiency,the expansion of the two financing targets is used as a natural experiment.However,it is difficult to us the expansion of the two financing targets to study pricing efficiency to avoid the problem of sample self selection.Adopting the system as a natural experiment can avoid this problem.
Qualified Securities for Short-sale Refinancingshort selling transactionsearnings managementcorporate growthproperty rights
国家科技期刊平台
NSTL
万方数据
