Research on Incentive Mechanism for Knowledge Transfer of Entrepreneur Considering Incentive Deviation and Fair Preference
Knowledge transfer stands as a critical avenue for venture capital(VC)and entrepreneurial firms to mitigate collaboration risks and enhance cooperation efficiency.The incentivization of entrepreneurial firms to enhance their proactivity in knowledge transfer has been a pivotal subject in entrepreneurial collaboration.However,within the intricate reality of collaboration between entrepreneurial firms and VC,the incentive process often accompanies inconsistencies in the perception of knowledge transfer by entrepreneurial firms,giving rise to incentive biases and fairness imbalances.Acknowledging this,the present study focuses on the issues of incen-tive biases and fairness imbalances in the knowledge transfer motivation process of entrepreneurial firms.It specifically explores the relationship between entrepreneurial knowledge transfer and VC incentives,emphasizing the dual factors of complete rationality and the interaction between incentive biases and fairness preferences.The aim is to provide a multi-faceted perspective and reference for the theoretical support and practical implementa-tion of collaboration mechanisms between VC and entrepreneurial firms.The study constructs a model of entrepreneurial knowledge transfer incentives under conditions of complete rationality and the dual effects of incentive biases and fairness preferences.Building upon mathematical models and equilibrium solution analyses,the study employs model construction,theoretical deduction,and simulation analysis to explore the micro-level mechanisms of incentive biases,fairness imbalances,knowledge transfer quantity,and risk costs on VC incentive intensity selection and entrepreneurial knowledge transfer effort levels.Under conditions of complete rationality,incentive biases are positively correlated with entrepreneurial knowledge transfer effort levels,with negative incentive biases weakening the proactiveness of entrepreneurial firms in knowledge transfer,and positive incentive biases having the opposite effect.The impact of incentive biases on the optimal VC incentive intensity is influenced by knowledge transferability and risk costs,exhibiting an inverted U-shaped relationship.In scenarios involving both fairness preferences and incentive biases,the pres-ence of fairness preferences intensifies the impact of incentive biases on the proactiveness of entrepreneurial firms in knowledge transfer,showing a U-shaped relationship with knowledge transfer effort levels.On the other hand,the relationship among incentive biases,fairness preferences,and the optimal VC incentive intensity is complex,influenced by knowledge transferability and risk costs.Specifically,under conditions of advantage inequality,posi-tive incentive biases increase the proactiveness of entrepreneurial firms in knowledge transfer,and higher perceived fairness strengthens their willingness to transfer knowledge.VC needs to appropriately increase incentive intensity to ensure the proactiveness of entrepreneurial firms in knowledge transfer while considering its own incentive costs.Under conditions of disadvantage inequality,within a limited range of negative incentive biases,VC can achieve high incentives at lower costs through differentiated incentive intensities.However,with the exacerbation of negative incentive biases and a preference for disadvantage inequality,VC needs to increase incentive intensity to mitigate the negative effects of unequal benefits on entrepreneurial knowledge transfer.Further research could extend to aspects such as collaboration models and structural relationships between VC and entrepreneurial firms for a comprehensive understanding of entrepreneurial collaboration mechanisms.Additionally,the research can expand to different industry backgrounds of VC and entrepreneurial collaboration,as well as multi-party games under typical social preference scenarios.Further refinement of research objects and a deeper exploration of the micro-mechanisms of collaboration models could provide more specific and practical theoretical guidance for actual entrepreneurial practices.