考虑由一个合同制造商(Contract Manufacturer，CM)和一个原始设备制造商(Original Equipment Manufacturer，OEM)组成的二级供应链，CM在为OEM代工的同时，也引入自己的品牌与OEM竞争。在OEM能够获取消费者质量偏好信息的前提下，分析不同信息结构和 CM 高质量入侵行为对供应链成员定价决策的影响。研究发现，(1)CM入侵总是对自身有利，而对OEM不利。(2)信息不对称始终损害CM的利益，但只有在CM入侵且高低偏好市场之间的差异较大时才损害OEM的利润。(3)若真实市场偏好较高，且不掌握信息的CM对市场信心较弱，则OEM产品的定价能使所有消费者的需求都得到满足。(4)提高代工产品的质量在CM不入侵或者信息对称下对CM有利，而其余情况下是否有利与CM销售成本有关。进一步讨论了消费者偏好信息的作用，发现多数情况下OEM不获取消费者信息对自身更有利。
Research on High Quality Encroachment Strategy of Contract Manufacturers under Asymmetric Information of Consumer Preference
In the past decades,many Contract Manufacturers(CMs)manufactured products for Original Equip-ment Manufacturers(OEMs).Since CMs have mastered the knowledge and technology of OEMs in the produc-tion process,they have the ability to develop products by themselves.Therefore,many CMs encroach the market by establishing their own brands,which are called private brands.Most of the previous studies have assumed the quality of encroached products to be lower than that of OEM's products.However,in reality,there are quite a few CMs that encroach the market with high quality products.In addition,since manufacturer encroachment is affected by supply chain information structure,some researches have studied the encroachment problem under the combination of information asymmetry and quality factors.They can be roughly divided into two aspects:one is the information asymmetry between consumers and enterprises about product quality level;the other is the infor-mation asymmetry between enterprises about market demand.However,they do not consider the information asymmetry of consumers'quality preference.Based on the above background,this paper designs a two-level supply chain consisting of a CM and an OEM,in which a CM not only provides the OEM services,but also may introduce high-quality private products to compete with an OEM.Simultaneously,because the OEM has a better understanding of consumers,this paper also constructs an information asymmetry model of consumer quality preference.That is,heterogeneous consum-ers have different quality preferences for the same product,in which the OEM can obtain the specific distribution of consumer quality preference and know whether consumers prefer high quality or low quality overall.The CM only knows the probability of high or low distribution of consumer quality preference.In addition,since the CM can infer the true preference information by observing the OEM pricing,there is a signal game between the two sides.Based on this,we analyze the influences of different information structures and the CM high-quality encroachment decisions on the pricing and profit of supply chain members.In the following paper,four supply chain decision models of the CM encroachment or non-encroachment under two kinds of information structure are established by using the game theory,and the equilibrium pricing and optimal profit of each member are deduced by backward induction.After obtaining the equilibrium result,we first compare the profits of the CM and OEM in four cases to get the CM's decision to encroach.At the same time,we also discuss the influence of information structure on profits of both sides.Then,in order to obtain the conditions of consumer market clearing,we compare the price of the OEM's product with market clearing price.Subsequently,we explore the impact of the OEM product quality level on the CM profit under different costs of sales differences.Finally,in the extension model,we discuss the role of having an information advantage for the OEM.Through the above analysis,our research shows that:(1)The CM's encroachment is always beneficial to itself,but not to the OEM.(2)Information asymmetry always harms the CM's interests,but only will harm the OEM's profits when the CM encroaches and the difference between high and low preference markets is large.(3)If the preference of the real market is relatively high,and the CM without information has weak confidence in the market,the equilibrium pricing of the OEM's products can satisfy the needs of all consumers.(4)If the CM does not encroach or encroach under information symmetry,improving the quality of the OEM's products can improve both manufacturers'profits.However,if the CM encroaches under asymmetric information,the impact of the OEM's product quality on the CM revenue will be related to the cost of the CM's products sold.We further discuss the role of consumer preference information,and find that in most cases the OEM benefits itself more without access to consumer information.
contract manufacturer encroachmentconsumer preferenceinformation asymmetrysignal game
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