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高管股权激励动态性与企业绩效——研发投入的中介效应

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为了有效应对高管人力资本的动态性问题,企业亟须将传统的静态股权激励机制进行变革.本文基于第一类代理问题与动态激励相容的视角,采用2010-2021年中国上市公司的数据进行实证检验,研究高管股权激励动态性与企业绩效的关系,并探讨研发投入在其中可能存在的中介作用.研究发现:高管股权激励的动态性与长期成长性绩效显著正相关,与企业短期绩效不存在相关关系;高管股权激励的动态性与研发投入显著正相关;研发投入在高管股权激励动态性与企业长期绩效之间存在显著的中介作用.研究结论为中国上市企业优化高管股权激励机制、有效应对人力资本的动态性、促进研发,从而推动企业转型升级与持续成长提供可资参考的建议.
Dynamics of Executive Equity Incentive and Firm Performance—Mediating Effect of R&D Investment
In order to address the dynamic nature of executive human capital effectively,it is urgent for firms to change the traditional static equity incentive mechanism.From the perspectives of type Ⅰ agency problem and dynamic incentive compatibility,and based on the data of listed enterprises in China from 2010 to 2021,it analysed the relationship between the dynamics of executive equity incentives and firm performance,and explored the possible mediative role of R&D investment in it.The results show that the dynamics of executive equity incentives are significantly positively correlated with long-term growth performance,but there is no correlation with short-term performance;the dynamics of executive equity incentives are significantly positively correlated with R&D investment;R&D investment has a significant mediating effect on the relationship between the dynamics of executive equity incentives and the long-term performance of enterprises.The conclusions provide suggestions for optimizing the executive equity incentive mechanism of Chinese listed enterprises,effectively coping with the dynamics of human capital,promoting R&D,and promoting the transformation,upgrading and sustainable growth of enterprises.

dynamics of equity incentiveR&D investmenttype Ⅰ agency problemdynamic incentive compatibilityhuman capital

左晶晶、梅洁、唐跃军

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上海理工大学 管理学院,上海 200093

复旦大学 管理学院,上海 200433

高管股权激励动态性 研发投入 第一类代理问题 动态激励相容 人力资本

上海市哲学社会科学规划一般课题上海市哲学社会科学规划一般项目复旦大学管理学院科创企业管理问题研究专项项目重点项目

2023BGL0152020BGL02620210102

2024

研究与发展管理
复旦大学

研究与发展管理

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.503
ISSN:1004-8308
年,卷(期):2024.36(4)
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