高管股权激励动态性与企业绩效——研发投入的中介效应
Dynamics of Executive Equity Incentive and Firm Performance—Mediating Effect of R&D Investment
左晶晶 1梅洁 1唐跃军2
作者信息
- 1. 上海理工大学 管理学院,上海 200093
- 2. 复旦大学 管理学院,上海 200433
- 折叠
摘要
为了有效应对高管人力资本的动态性问题,企业亟须将传统的静态股权激励机制进行变革.本文基于第一类代理问题与动态激励相容的视角,采用2010-2021年中国上市公司的数据进行实证检验,研究高管股权激励动态性与企业绩效的关系,并探讨研发投入在其中可能存在的中介作用.研究发现:高管股权激励的动态性与长期成长性绩效显著正相关,与企业短期绩效不存在相关关系;高管股权激励的动态性与研发投入显著正相关;研发投入在高管股权激励动态性与企业长期绩效之间存在显著的中介作用.研究结论为中国上市企业优化高管股权激励机制、有效应对人力资本的动态性、促进研发,从而推动企业转型升级与持续成长提供可资参考的建议.
Abstract
In order to address the dynamic nature of executive human capital effectively,it is urgent for firms to change the traditional static equity incentive mechanism.From the perspectives of type Ⅰ agency problem and dynamic incentive compatibility,and based on the data of listed enterprises in China from 2010 to 2021,it analysed the relationship between the dynamics of executive equity incentives and firm performance,and explored the possible mediative role of R&D investment in it.The results show that the dynamics of executive equity incentives are significantly positively correlated with long-term growth performance,but there is no correlation with short-term performance;the dynamics of executive equity incentives are significantly positively correlated with R&D investment;R&D investment has a significant mediating effect on the relationship between the dynamics of executive equity incentives and the long-term performance of enterprises.The conclusions provide suggestions for optimizing the executive equity incentive mechanism of Chinese listed enterprises,effectively coping with the dynamics of human capital,promoting R&D,and promoting the transformation,upgrading and sustainable growth of enterprises.
关键词
高管股权激励动态性/研发投入/第一类代理问题/动态激励相容/人力资本Key words
dynamics of equity incentive/R&D investment/type Ⅰ agency problem/dynamic incentive compatibility/human capital引用本文复制引用
基金项目
上海市哲学社会科学规划一般课题(2023BGL015)
上海市哲学社会科学规划一般项目(2020BGL026)
复旦大学管理学院科创企业管理问题研究专项项目重点项目(20210102)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据