道德赞同/不赞同的情感反应
On Sentimental Reflection of Moral Approval/Disapproval
李家莲1
作者信息
- 1. 湖北大学 哲学学院,湖北 武汉 430062
- 折叠
摘要
不以任何既定道德判断为预制前提的道德赞同是道德情感主义哲学的核心理论问题.故,道德赞同的情感反应也相应成了道德情感主义哲学的关键理论问题.自 18 世纪以降,西方道德情感主义者形成了视苦乐感和温暖/冷漠感为道德赞同之情感反应的两种基本观点.本文反对这两种观点,认为道德赞同的情感反应虽然具有主观形式,却不具有绝对的主观性,而是赞同/不赞同机制的客观表达,更确切地说,以承应和定向目的/冲力为内涵的阴阳才是道德赞同的真正情感反应.
Abstract
Moral approval without presupposing any moral judgement is the central theoretical problem of moral sentimentalism.In this case,sentimental reflection is the key theoretical problem of moral sentimentalism.Western moral sentimentalists have taken hardship/happiness and warm/chilling as two basic sentimental reflection of moral approval/disapproval since the 18th century.The paper is against the two basic viewpoints,holds that the sentimental reflection of moral approval/disapproval contains both subjective and objective elements,to be specific,the Yin/Yang understood as receptivity and directed purpose/impulse is the real sentimental reflection of moral approval/disapproval.
关键词
道德赞同/苦乐感/承应/定向目的/冲力/阴阳Key words
moral approval/hardship/happiness/receptivity/directed purpose/impulse/Yin/Yang引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家社会科学基金重点项目(21AZX016)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据