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基于演化博弈的车联网分发消息激励机制

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由于车联网中节点资源有限,车联网中存在不愿意传递消息的自私车辆节点,严重影响网络性能.为了改善网络性能,提出了一种基于演化博弈的车联网消息合作分发的激励机制,利用节点始终追求最大收益的有限理性的特点,根据节点传递消息的数量以及节点在固定时间内的空闲程度设计收益函数,引导自私节点努力参与到车联网中消息的传递过程,同时引入路边单元作为监管者加速车辆节点的策略更新过程.仿真结果表明自私节点比例越多,网络性能越差,而该激励机制可以有效地改善存在自私节点的车联网的网络性能.
Incentive mechanism for distribution of messages in the Internet of vehicles based on evolutionary game
Due to the limited node resources in the VANETs,there are selfish vehicle nodes in the VANETs that are unwilling to forward messages,which seriously affects the network performance.In order to improve the network performance,this paper proposes an incentive mechanism for the cooperative distribution of VANETs messages based on evolutionary games,which utilizes the bounded rationality that nodes always pursue the maximum benefit.Based on the number of messages transmitted by nodes and the idleness of nodes in a fixed period of time,design a revenue function to guide selfish nodes to participate in the message transmission process in VANETs,and introduce roadside units as supervisors to accelerate the policy update process of vehicle nodes.The simulation results show that the higher the proportion of selfish nodes,the worse the network performance.The incentive mechanism proposed in this paper can effectively improve the network performance of VANETs with selfish nodes.

vehicular Ad hoc networksselfish nodeevolutionary gameincentiverevenue functionroadside unitspacket delivery rateaverage transmission delay

王桐、林孟瑜、欧阳敏、曹越

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哈尔滨工程大学信息与通信工程学院,黑龙江哈尔滨 150001

哈尔滨工程大学先进船舶通信与信息技术工业和信息化部重点实验室,黑龙江哈尔滨 150001

武汉大学国家网络安全学院,湖北武汉 430072

车联网 自私节点 演化博弈 激励 收益函数 路边单元 数据包投递率 平均传输时延

先进船舶通信和信息技术产业和信息技术部重点实验室项目

AMCIT2101-08

2024

应用科技
哈尔滨工程大学

应用科技

CSTPCD
影响因子:0.693
ISSN:1009-671X
年,卷(期):2024.51(3)
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